



Abstract: In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that
dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing
and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide
reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their
manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties
at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and
some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of
ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised
by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening
test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism.
Keywords: dispositions, properties, necessitarianism, modality, antecedent
strengthening
The Question
Dispositional properties manifest their effects in specific stimulating conditions
or in interaction with partners. Classic examples in the philosophical and
scientific literature are solubility and fragility. Something is soluble if, when
immersed in a liquid, it dissolves; similarly, fragility is manifested if something
shatters when struck. We are all acquainted with these kinds of properties,
which are not confined to the physical world, but also found in the psycholog-
ical world, such as when we consider someone irascible who is quick to react if
provoked. The crucial issue is the strength of the relation between the stimulat-
ing conditions S and the manifestation M of a dispositional property D. Take a
delicate glass, hit it with a hammer: will it necessarily shatter or rather will it
typically shatter? What happens when a dispositional property is not manifested
or is prevented from manifesting itself, as when we wrap the glass in bubble
wrap? The importance of these questions derives from our need to understand
how strongly change and stability cleave together or, better, how strong the
stability we can find in change is. Many authors think that the relation between
the manifestation of a disposition and its stimulating condition is one of easing
*Corresponding author: Simone Gozzano, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Università degli
Studi Dell’Aquila, Viale Nizza 14, L’Aquila 67100, Italy, E-mail: simone.gozzano@univaq.it
Metaphysica 2020; aop
Authenticated | simone.gozzano@univaq.it author's copy
Download Date | 1/16/20 10:25 AM
(Vetter 2015) or of habitual doing (Fara 2005) or a sui generis modality between
possibility and necessity (Mumford and Anjum 2011a), surely not one of
necessitation.
One way to address the “modality status” of these properties is to resort to
ceteris paribus clauses: this allows us to sidestep the apparently endless excep-
tions that may interfere or prevent the manifestation of a disposition. Basically,
by using ceteris paribus clauses, a disposition is analysed into a conditional
sentence of the form “if object O is given stimulus S it will manifest M ceteris
paribus”. Contessa (2013), in a thoughtful paper, has argued that it is possible to
provide such a conditional analysis using a non-circular specification of the
proper conditions in which a disposition is manifested. My aim in this paper is to
follow Contessa’s line of reasoning, setting conditions under which we can
reduce the number of the ceteris paribus clauses from a given law or conditional
statement to eventually eliminate them altogether, thus supporting the idea that
stimulated dispositions necessitate their manifestations. This result can be
achieved by clarifying which relevant properties are at stake when the condi-
tional manifestation of a dispositional property is set.
In what follows, I will state the necessitarian view in general, then I will
advance my own view on how necessitarianism could be improved; finally, I will
argue that the antecedent strengthening test proposed by Stephen Mumford and
Rani Anjum (2011a) against necessitarianism is a test for causal relevance rather
than a test for the modal force of dispositional properties, and should be used as
a method to eliminate the ceteris paribus clauses. My purpose here is to argue
that an object having a disposition will necessarily manifest it in the proper
circumstances or under the proper stimulation, and in so arguing I will take
Mumford and Anjum to be my main opponents.
Necessitarianism
The necessitarian view has been stated in different ways by different authors.
Brian Ellis argues that everything with disposition D that undergoes stimulus S
(or that has contact with a powerful partner such that stimulus S is produced)
will necessarily manifest M, as in:
1) ∀xNec. ((Dx & Sx) → Mx) (Ellis 2001, 286)
Alexander Bird, for his part, has argued that (reading D(S,M)x as x has the
Disposition to manifest M under stimulus S) from:
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“i) □ (D(S,M)x ↔Sx □→ Mx) and
ii) □ (Px → D(S,M)x) we can derive:
iii) ∀x ((Px & Sx) → Mx)”1
but that, given the possibility of interference in the manifestation of the dispo-
sition, i) is false, and we must add a ceteris paribus clause, to conclude:
2) ∀x (ceteris paribus (Dx & Sx) → Mx)) (Bird 2007, 59–60, renumbered).
To put Bird’s argument into words: If (i) necessarily, x is disposed D to manifest
M in response to stimulus S if and only if when stimulated it manifests M,2 and
(ii) necessarily, if x has property P then it is essentially disposed to yield M if
stimulated S, then (iii) for all x, if x has property P and is stimulated S, then it
manifests M. However, since the manifestation of all dispositions – excluding
the fundamental ones – can be interfered with, it is crucial to add the ceteris
paribus clause (2). The views put forward by Ellis and Bird are, in fact, similar.
Both views take the relation between the stimulated disposition and its mani-
festation to be a necessary one or to invariably occur ceteris paribus, and they
derive the laws of nature from such relations: the tighter the relations, the
stronger the laws. In Bird’s view, because hidden interferences are absent only
at the most fundamental level of reality, it is only at this level that these
relations are necessary. At this level, then, we can dispense with ceteris paribus
clauses, and the laws built on these fundamental relations are necessary. So,
thesis 2 holds for all properties; for properties at the most fundamental level,
Bird’s view holds in its stronger form as in iii.3 Can we defend the necessitarian
view not just at the fundamental level but at all levels? It is the purpose of this
paper to reply in the affirmative and to find a way to pinpoint which properties
determine the possible interferences that force one to add the ceteris paribus
clause, so to dispense with the ceteris paribus clause even at a non-fundamental
level.
Before diving into this problem, though, it is important to make clear what
necessitarianism doesn’t say. In arguing that dispositions should be analysed
according to a sui generis modality, one weaker than necessity but stronger than
mere possibility, Mumford and Anjum (2011a, 2011b) criticize necessitarianism,
showing the defensibility of these four claims:
1 This line should have been □∀x ((Px & Sx) → Mx), a thesis that Bird states on p. 48, but he
develops this only for fundamental properties.
2 The □→ symbolizes the subjunctive / counterfactual conditional, as in Lewis (1973).
3 On the issue of dispositions, powers, and laws, see Kistler (2012).
Necessitarianism and Dispositions 3
Authenticated | simone.gozzano@univaq.it author's copy
Download Date | 1/16/20 10:25 AM
3) ~(DMa → □Ma) (Dispositions don’t always manifest);
4) DMa → ~□Ma (Dispositions can always be prevented);
5) ~(□Ma → DMa) (Cases of necessity are not always cases of dispositionality);
6) □Ma→~DMa (Cases of necessity are never cases of dispositionality)
(Mumford and Anjum 2011b, 386).
Taking 3 as an example, with M being shattering, Mumford and Anjum’s thesis
can be read thus: it is not the case that if a has the disposition to shatter (a is
fragile) then it necessarily shatters.4 Now, leaving aside that Mumford and Anjum
do not mention stimuli, a problem with their attack on necessitarianism is that
they take properties rather than relations to be necessary. Necessitarianism,
however, takes relations to be necessary, not properties.5
Consider claim 3: placing the modal operator on properties rather than on
relations is tantamount to committing the “modal scope fallacy”, which consists
in failing to recognize that the scope of the necessity operator is on the con-
sequence relation (the whole conditional) rather than solely on the consequent of
the entailment. As Sider puts it, “the distinction between ϕ→ □ψ and □ (ϕ→ψ)
is called the distinction between the ‘necessity of the consequent’ and the
‘necessity of the consequence’” (Sider 2010, 176). What bearing does such a
misreading have on this matter?
If the necessitarian view is taken to hinge on the presence of necessary
properties, this makes the dispositional view somewhat self-defeating. In this
regard, Mumford and Anjum themselves say, “A necessarily manifesting prop-
erty looks to be, if anything is, a categorical property, and this rules out the case
of a disposition involving manifestation” (Mumford and Anjum 2011b, 387). A
categorical property is a property that depends on the local laws of nature for its
interactions with the world. It is a property that keeps itself to itself, to para-
phrase Armstrong (1997, 80).6 If a property necessarily manifests itself, this
means it has no dependence on any stimuli or conditions. If necessitarianism
were so interpreted, it would entail that there are no unmanifested dispositions.
4 The other cases show that dispositions can always be prevented (4); that cases of necessity are
not always cases of dispositionality (5) and that cases of necessity are never cases of disposition-
ality (6). The last one, as Mumford and Anjum recognize, is the most difficult to argue for.
5 See Ingthorsson (2013) for an interesting analysis on how to conceive of dispositions in this
respect.
6 Black (2000) argues that categorical properties are causally inert. Hüttemann (2007) has also
argued that dispositions can be taken as continuously manifesting dispositions, but not as
necessarily manifesting. I am assuming that the distinction between categorical and disposi-
tional properties is accepted. For a general review see Choi and Fara (2012). For arguments
against the distinction, see Martin (2008) and Heil (2003).
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If there were no unmanifested dispositions, there would be no dispositions at
all, because dependence on the presence of a condition or a stimulus for
manifestation is part of what it means to be a disposition. True, some authors
(e. g. Vetter 2015) deny that dispositions necessarily request stimuli, but they do
not deny that dispositions necessarily fail to always manifest. Consequently, the
only interpretation compatible with the theses endorsed by Ellis and Bird is to
take the modal operator as applying to the consequence relation. To make a case
against necessitarianism, the proper formulation of those theses might be7:
3*) ~□∀x (D(S,M)x → (Sx→ Mx));
4*) ∀x ◊ (D(S,M)x & Sx → ~Mx);
and analogously for 5 and 6, whose appropriate formulation should have been:
5*) ◊∀x (Mx → ~ (D(S,M)x & Sx))
6*) ∀x □ ((Sx →Mx) → ~D(S,M)x).
Having dispelled these possible misunderstandings, let us go back to the main
problem: can we do without ceteris paribus clauses in the analysis of
dispositions?
“Dispositions Can Always Be prevented”
Ceteris paribus clauses are the technical solution for bracketing all the possible
ways in which a dispositional property might not manifest itself once the proper
conditions obtain or once it has been stimulated. But how metaphysically deep
are these clauses intended to be? On the one hand, Mumford and Anjum (2011a, 76)
say, “If two tokens of the same dispositions were placed in identical contexts –
identical in every causally relevant respect for that disposition – they would
produce identical manifestations”. So, as Markus Schrenk underlines (2016, 76),
“there is a sense of necessity that Mumford and Anjum acknowledge” because
identity of contexts can be interpreted, as Schrenk interprets them, as identity of
worlds. On the other hand, they argue that there is no need to move from this to the
stronger claim that identical manifestations are necessitated by the same disposi-
tions. A case in point is that of indeterministic dispositions, such as radioactive
decay.We know that two identical tokens of radioactive material placed in identical
circumstances may differ in their manifestations, in that one may decay at some
7 I have re-written the theses in analogy with Bird’s notation, having D as disposition, S as
stimulus and M as manifestation. Even if the formulations proposed are more appropriate than
those proposed by Mumford and Anjum, I am not committing myself to all of them.
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time twhile the other may not. To what extent should we take this as a problem for
necessitarianism? The necessitarianist can have two possible responses: to bite the
bullet and accept that indeterminism and necessitation are not compatible with
each other, and that one must conditionally limit necessitarianism to deterministic
phenomena; or to argue that this argument is not compelling: let’s see this second
thread. In decay phenomena, besides the instability of the atomic nuclei, time is the
crucial factor. However, time differs across the various occurrences of decay phe-
nomena: so, there is no way to claim that the entailment “given an amount of time
x, this particle will decay” fails, because – given indeterminism – the antecedent
cannot be established in a rigorous and stable way. Why choose x to be
10,000years as opposed to 10,001? If there is no principled way to set the ante-
cedent, there is no way to be clear about the truth-conditions of the entailment.
Necessitarianism is still alive.
Setting aside the issue of indeterministic phenomena, the main argument
Mumford and Anjum enlist against necessitarianism is that “the possibility of
prevention [in the sense of both negative and positive interference] leaves no
room for any kind of necessity in causal production” (2011a, 53). This argument,
which is based on ideas brought into play by Eagle (2009) and Schrenk (2010a),
aims at deterministic, not indeterministic dispositions.
In arguing that deterministic dispositions can always be prevented, does
“always” have an implicit modal force?8 For one may immediately raise the
question: if disposition D can always be prevented, is this tantamount to saying
that D can necessarily be prevented? This would be a necessitarian thesis in
disguise, one in which a meta-anti-disposition is ready to be triggered if the
disposition is correctly stimulated. Mumford and Anjum may rebut that “always”
is not modal. A more plausible reading is the following: if disposition D occurs
along with an activating power, then in any case there is the possibility that a
preventer may block its manifestation.9 Basically, preventers of D can be as varied
as we like, so that whenever D is stimulated, there will be some preventer or
another that interferes with its manifestation.10 In this case, the apparent endless-
ness of the preventers is sufficient in Mumford and Anjum’s eyes to block any
necessitation relation that might lead from stimulus to manifestation given any
disposition. It is time to see how necessitarianism addresses this difficulty.
8 Eagle (2009, 20) takes “always” to be a temporal analogue to alethic necessity.
9 This interpretation can be formalized as follows: For all x, if x is disposed D and is stimulated
S, there is a possible y such that y is a preventer P such to block the manifestation M of x, that
is: ∀x∃y (Dx & Sx → ◊ (Py & ~Mx)).
10 Various interferences are possible, including finks, masks and antidotes. I will consider
them below, putting positive masking aside.
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Necessity
Necessitarianism allows us to deal with the co-occurrence of mutability and
stability in this world, without assuming that this is simply a matter of regularity
or counterfactual dependence. For if regularity were the norm, deviant cases
could be analysed as infrequent cases, possibly due to interfering factors. Then
we would still have interfering factors, without being clear about what kind of
reliability we could attribute to the regularity of the events. Perhaps the reli-
ability of the causal relations is a function of the number of deviant cases. But
then we would be left with further questions: what makes deviant cases deviant?
Can we obtain deviant cases regularly? It seems to me that these questions point
to the fact that we are not looking for a statistical solution; rather, we want to
know why the deviance occurred, what went wrong in the structure of the
relation understood as causal. This question is also left unanswered by the
idea that causal relations are nothing but counterfactual dependences. For we
may record that for some events c and e, had c not happened, e would not have
happened either. But counterfactual dependence relies on factual dependence,
and it is not possible to generalize from factual dependence to counterfactual
dependence unless we assume that there are types of events that establish
relations robust enough to support the counterfactuals. In such a case, though,
we are left with the question: how modally robust are these relations?
Consequently, a commitment regarding the modal force of such relations is
needed anyway.
So-called Dispositional essentialism came to the rescue by coupling Aristotelian
essentialism, the view that entities have some properties essentially – as part of
their nature – with the dispositional view, according to which properties are
ultimately irreducible dispositions that determine the way entities causally interact
with each other (cfr. Schrenk 2016). The very nature of a property, then, is to confer
on its bearers the causal powers they manifest (Shoemaker 1980). These causal
powers can be appreciated in interaction with other causal partners (Ingthorsson
2002; Heil 2012). With dispositional essentialism, necessitarianism comes as part of
the bundle: if entities have their properties essentially, this means that they have
these properties necessarily. If such properties are individuated by the causal
powers they confer, these powers are necessary as well. Thus, dispositional essen-
tialism sees the causal relations determined by these properties as necessary, which
is the main tenet of necessitarianism.
A disposition D is essentially individuated by its causal relations, defined as
the kind of manifestation/ output it produces given the activating power/input it
encounters. Being so individuated, disposition D wouldn’t be the property it is
Necessitarianism and Dispositions 7
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unless it engaged in those relations. However, if either the acting powers or the
manifestations of a disposition are interfered with, the disposition is conse-
quently also interfered with. If a disposition is interfered with, there is a sense
in which we can say that it is not the original disposition we are talking about
anymore, because the input/ output relations have changed. However, one may
want to resist this conclusion. The way out is either to say that a property cannot
be essentially or necessarily characterized by its causal relations, thus renounc-
ing dispositional essentialism, or to say that the stimulating or triggering con-
ditions of the disposition were different from those that hold in similar cases
when the expected manifestation occurs. It is this second path that I want to
explore.
Let us consider the manifestation M of a disposition D by some stimulation S
(for instance, the striking of a fragile glass) as a causal relation. The causal
relation SD ⇒ MD can be depicted as involving one or more powers P1, P2, … Pn,
that belong either to the stimulus or to the object or both the dispositional
partners (e. g.: the structure of the glass, the magnitude of the mass striking it,
its momentum, etc.). The necessitation relation in force between S and M holds in
virtue of all the powers involved. We cannot have a change in the causal relation
SD ⇒ MD without a change in one or more of the powers of that causal relation.
Therefore, to interfere with the necessitation brought by S on the bearer of D such
that this bearer will manifest M, a preventer must interfere with one or more of the
powers at play.11 That is, for something to qualify as an interferer with disposition
D it must have the right kind of causal powers and to a sufficient degree.
S and M, the essential features of disposition D, are events, each having one
or more constitutive powers (following Kim’s view of events – Kim 1976) as
brought about by one or more bearers. So the relation is that S (in virtue of its
powers P1S, P2S, … PnS) causes M (i. e. its powers P1M, P2M, … PnM), and for
something to qualify as a preventer of such a relation it must interfere either
with some member of the first set or with some member of the second set or with
one or more members of both sets. So, the apparently endless ways in which a
causal relation can be interfered with12 are a function of the powers involved in
11 The relation between disposition and powers as described here is parallel to another
distinction, originally proposed by Borghini and Williams (2007). These two authors distinguish
between dispositions and dispositional properties. “Disposition”, they argue, is a generic place-
holder for a certain kind of relation (e. g. solubility); “dispositional properties” are those fine-
grained causal relations that determine the way in which, for instance, salt is soluble in water
and not in alcohol while iodine is the opposite. I prefer to use “powers” instead of “disposi-
tional properties” to avoid confusion between “dispositions” and “dispositional properties”.
12 See Armstrong (1983, 149) and Contessa (2013, 404) for concerns in this regard.
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the relation. And the powers involved are not endless, because the relata are
actual events.13 In this way, both the stimulus or trigger and the manifestation
are taken as maximal state, that is, states maximally specified and such that any
change in any part of them determines a different causal relation.
To illustrate this point, imagine a simplified world.14 In this world, there is
only one object O, having disposition D, by the interaction of power P, pertain-
ing to O, and power Q which, by triggering P, determines manifestation M. It is
only by acting on either P or Q or both that D can be prevented from manifesting
M. A fink would prevent Q from interacting with P, a mask would modify the
way in which P and Q interact, an antidote would constitute an early-acting anti-
Q, preempting Q’s interaction with P, and a mimic would be some non-D Object
manifesting M. Excluding the case of the mimic, which violates the example by
adding something, it is only by acting on either P or Q that interference can
occur. And the action on P or Q must amount to something incompatible with
the way in which P or Q interact. Clearly, if we add a further power, say K, the
interferer may also interact with it, but the point is that to have causal effects,
the interferer must interact with the causal relations at stake. So any interferer
must interact with the fundamental powers involved in the causal relation. One
general principle that can be established to define this interaction is the princi-
ple of causal relevance. I define it as follows:
Causal Relevance: Property P is causally relevant to relation R if and only if
variations in the value/ magnitude of P result in variations in the value/
magnitude of R.
The null condition of this principle is that in which variations of P do not result
in variations in R; in such a case P isn’t causally relevant to R.15 If any variation
13 An alternative argument on this point could be the following: the more specific D is, the
fewer the Ps that can be realizable robustly. Take D to be the disposition to be scratched
(“scratchability”). If x is a sapphire (a variety of corundum) then only a diamond can scratch it.
Therefore, any candidate for preventing the sapphire from being scratched must impede the
physical contact between the two; otherwise it will fail to prevent the power of diamond to
scratch sapphire. Consider the fragility of glass. The shattering of the glass can be prevented by
anything that blocks the direct application of a force ≥ n for n taken as the value sufficient to
overcome the bonding relations in the lattice structure of the sample of glass under consid-
eration. As we know there are many ways to prevent this before or after contact is made
(Contessa 2013). However, in every case the preventers must interfere with this fundamental
property. Vetter (2015) argues against this view, but I cannot enter this discussion here.
14 Here I am imagining a condition parallel Bird’s fundamental level.
15 A threshold effect may be obtained, that is, one in which insufficient variations in a
(relevant) P do not result in any variation in R.
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in P results in some variation in R then P is causally relevant, but its relevance
could be due to other and co-occurring properties. If there is a correlation
between the magnitude of P and the magnitude of R then P is crucially relevant
to R. For instance, if variations in P are linearly/ logarithmically/ x-ly correlated
with variations in R, then P is a fundamentally relevant property for relation
R. Notice that the correlation can be very complicated, as is the case for temper-
ature and conductivity in superconductivity, but if it can be tracked then its
relevance holds. Once this principle has been established, causal interactions,
as those in which interferers play a role, can be better understood. Let us define
more generally the conditions for interaction, conditions that interferers as well
should meet:
Interaction by I with disposition D of object O occurs iff:
1) P1, P2, … Pn are all and the only powers involved in O’s stimulation/
association with the causal partner during time interval t1-t2;
2) I, at time interval t1-t2, exemplifies either P1 or P2 or … or Pn;
3) The presence of I results in a modification in the value (vector/scalar) of one
or more powers P1, P2, … Pn exemplified after t2.
What these conditions say is that the only way in which it is possible to
interfere with a disposition D is by having properties that are causally
relevant for the SD ⇒ MD relation to obtain, and that are present in sufficient
proportion. Basically, the Ps specified in these conditions implement the
principle of causal relevance by showing: (1) that we must look at the
relevant powers; (2) that the interferer must be causally relevant, and (3)
that that interferer is what determines some causal effect as expressed in the
principle of causal relevance. It is important to note that condition 3 differs
according to the type of interferer at stake, for there might be cases in which
an interferer causes an all-or-nothing prevention or a proportionality effect (a
venom antidote). These conditions cannot be changed without changing the
relation as well. They should be considered as a comprehensive whole. One
may ask, how can we distinguish between interferers and the causal partners
of D? We can’t: an interferer is simply an unexpected causal partner of D, one
that wasn’t intended to be at stake. Basically, every entity that may manifest
powers P1, P2, … Pn is a potential causal partner for D, that may interact with
it. I think most of the discussion has been vitiated by the thought that there
is a crisp and clear distinction between ideal conditions and interferences.
Every causal relation, among which dispositions manifestations belong, sets
10 S. Gozzano
Authenticated | simone.gozzano@univaq.it author's copy
Download Date | 1/16/20 10:25 AM
its own condition. This point makes it evident that necessitarianism implicitly
endorses another principle, one that I will name after Hobbes16:
Hobbes’ Principle: All the relevant powers involved in a causal relation are
necessary for it to obtain.
Hobbes’ principle states that a causal relation is individuated by all its
relevant powers, those that make the relation what it is. Thus, my defence
of necessitarianism depends on accepting the principle of causal relevance,
the conditions for it to operate and Hobbes’ principle. Therefore, necessity
applies to maximally specified relations.17 Modifying any of the conditions
would bring about a different relation because different powers would be at
stake. Schrenk stresses this point, saying, “metaphysical necessity is discrete:
that two specific properties or event types … are necessarily linked together …
has no bearing whatsoever on the instantiations and correlations of any other
properties or event types even if they are very much [a]like” (Schrenk 2010a,
732). Committing to the necessity of the relation SD ⇒ MD doesn’t commit one
to the necessity of the relation S*D ⇒ MD, where S and S* are similar to each
other. If it is the case that S*D ⇒ MD, that doesn’t mean that there is some
flexibility in how M can be caused: rather, it shows that necessity applies to
the many ways a disposition may manifest itself and that what differentiates
S from S* is some power irrelevant for the causal relation at stake (cfr. Vetter
2015; Schrenk 2016, 278, n. 59). Finally, notice that this is compatible with a
disposition never manifesting itself: that it remains a potentiality indicates
that the proper stimuli/conditions have never been manifested. Necessity,
then, holds for the various relations as set by the relevant causal conditions
at stake. One criticism must be considered now: the anti-necessitarianism of
Mumford and Anjum.
16 I attribute this principle to Hobbes with reference to several passages in his dialogue with
Bramhall in Liberty and Necessity: “If there be a necessity that an action shall be done or that
any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily
required as a means to bring it to pass”, and also “… this consequence, if the effect shall
necessarily come to pass then it shall come to pass without its cause, is a false one …” Thomas
Hobbes, Vere Chappell 1999: 26.
17 There is a further semantic reason (a Kripkean one) for accepting this principle: we extrap-
olate from the original condition in which the stimulus brought about the manifestation; this
connection entails all the properties in which the conditional was formulated.
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Against Necessitarianism: The Test of Antecedent
Strengthening
Mumford and Anjum’s conviction that necessitarianism about dispositions fails is
based on the idea that “any causal process can be interfered with or prevented by
the introduction of some additional factor.” This concern has afflicted many
philosophers in their attempts to provide either analyses of the semantics of
dispositional properties or metaphysical descriptions of their structure (see for
instance, Vetter 2015; Choi 2012; Fara 2005; Molnar 2003; Manley and Wasserman
2011; McKitrick 2003; Yates 2013; Contessa 2013; Cross 2011 for a review).
Instead of trying to repair the definition or provide better analyses, Mumford
and Anjum propose to implement a test for checking the modal force of dispo-
sitions. This test, which finds its roots in Goodman (1954) and has been revived
by Eagle (2009) and Schrenk (2010a, 2010b), is described as follows: “The idea is
that if causation involves any kind of necessity, it should survive the test of
antecedent strengthening.” (Mumford and Anjum 2011a, 56) The antecedent
strengthening test (A-S test, henceforth) is intended to apply to conditionals,
and works as follows: if the semantic value of a conditional remains unchanged
for any consistent expansion of its antecedent, then the conditional holds
necessarily. The test is the application of the idea that necessity is, as Schrenk
(2010a) puts it, monotonic, that is, that no additional factor can change the
outcome of a necessary relation.
The test is formally written as follows:
If A necessitates B, then:
if A plus ϕ, for any ϕ, then B (Mumford and Anjum 2011a, 57)
According to these authors, “in case of genuine necessity, where A necessitates
B, no new information or extra premise can prevent B if A is the case” (Ivi).18
Identity statements are examples of genuine necessity, and in such cases the test
doesn’t fail. However, the test fails for every case of causation. Therefore,
causation is not a necessary relation.19 Let us see the test at work in these two
cases.
18 Here, Mumford and Anjum seem inclined to consider the proper interpretation of necessi-
tarianism, in which it is the relation that is necessary, not the relata. This would show that they
have been drifting between two different understandings of necessitarianism.
19 Lowe (2014) has protested that the logic behind the strengthening test can be rejected if
other, different systems of logic are adopted.
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Identity: take A and B to be “This is water” and “This is H2O” respectively.
This engenders the following identity relation, in conditional form, “If this is
water then it is H2O”, a statement that remains true for every value of ϕ, such as
“If this is water and Madonna is a man then it is H2O”. So, if identity is involved,
the relation between A and B is one of necessitation.
Causation: take A to be “the match is struck” and B as “it lights.” The
conditional “If the match is struck it lights” is made false for many ϕs, such
as “the match is wet,” “there is no oxygen”, and so forth. Therefore, if causation
is involved the relation between A and B is not one of necessitation.
Can necessitarianism bear out this test? In the rest of this paper I shall argue
that (1) there could be constraints on the conditions for applying the test; (2) if
these conditions are properly applied, the test can be accepted by the neces-
sitarian, since it constitutes a test for causal relevance rather than a test for the
modal force of dispositional properties.
Applying the Test
The Case of Identity
As we have seen, the test is applied to both identity and causal relations. However,
in many cases both causation and identity are involved. Take A and B as in the first
example and let ϕ be “poured into alcohol”. Then we have “If this is water and it is
poured into alcohol then it is H2O”. Now, this is empirically false if “it” is taken to be
the actual mix of water and alcohol. On the other hand, if the proper reading of “it”
amounts to the same reference of “this”, the conditional is fine, but surely for
semantic reasons more than for empirical ones, for no one can refer to the mole-
cules of water dispersed in the mix, nor would anyone want to say that this
reference is an ideal one. The cases of causation and identity are problematic in a
second way. Beyond the usual sense (water = H2O), there is a sense of identity
Mumford and Anjum (2011a, 3–4) consider: a property is identical to a cluster of
causal powers. If this is the case, the conjunction of all the causal powers that are
part of the identity of a property should withstand the test. Consider the following:
A = this is spherical;
B = this is disposed to roll straight on an inclined plane.
By assuming that the tendency to roll straight on an inclined plane is one of the
conjunct of the identity conditions of the property of being spherical, Mumford and
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Anjum stress that spherical objects can be prevented from rolling straight: “a soap
bubble sticks to the surface, a bowling ball may have a weight in one side that
causes it to roll in a curved line,…”. The reason these balls do not roll straight is that
they have one (or more) countervailing powers ϕ acting on them. Having observed
this, the further step that I think we should take is to ask ourselves: how ready are
we to omit the tendency to roll straight on a plane from the identity conditions of
sphericality to account for countervailing dispositions? In identifying what x is, we
can either describe x’s constitutive elements or what x does, where this second
identification may be deducible from the first. If what x does runs against what x is,
rather than revising the identity conditions of x, the sphere in our case, I think we
should isolate the countervailing powers that determine its anomalous behaviour,
because it is these that interfere with the essential conditions that individuate what
x, a sphere, is. Otherwise, rolling or not rolling straight are just equal possibilities
and we should not expect anything from a sphere in terms of rolling paths notwith-
standing geometrical analysis to the contrary.
Basically, since both identity and causation are involved, we should under-
stand that in the case described by Mumford and Anjum we are considering not
just the geometrical property of the sphere, but a mass sphere, in which every
point of equivalent mass is equidistant from the centre, i. e. an object of homo-
geneous stratification; and what we have in mind when we consider rolling are
conditions of friction within a certain range. In the case of a curve-rolling
sphere, then, we would say that the object is not a sphere all the way through,
and it is the not-homogeneous stratification that necessitates the curved path it
takes (assuming the plane to be perfect, of course). In saying that something is a
sphere, then, we are, in accordance with Hobbes’ Principle, grouping together
several properties, some geometrical, others physical. The fact that we encoun-
ter a violation in its expected causal path doesn’t imply that we should abandon
its identifying properties and their necessitating effects. Rather, it shows that the
A-S test is to be understood as the way in which attempts to isolate interfering
factors are devised and formulated. Basically, identifying a property with a set of
dispositions does not obligate one to give up its identity because of vagaries in
the conditional analysis of the property itself; rather, it forces to recognize that
the necessitation relation holds according to the conditions at stake.20
If one is not willing to abandon the identity of properties with their set of
causal powers, then one reconsiders the significance and the role of the A-S
test as a method for distinguishing cases of identity from cases of causality.
Countervailing powers should be considered along the lines that I will
suggest for causation, as causally relevant powers for manifesting the
20 For a critical assessment of this point, see Marmodoro (2015).
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property of being spherical. Let us examine how to consider dispositional
causal relations with respect to the A-S test.
The Case of Causality
Consider thematchmanifesting its disposition to light once struck. According to the
A-S test, there is no necessitation: taking ϕ as “the oxygen is missing” determines
the failure of the conditional – “if the match is struck it lights”. But what is exactly
revealed by such a case? The causal relation under discussion holds for all those
cases in which the value of ϕ is something like “it is in my left hand,” “the match is
coloured blue,” and so forth. However, we do not consider these to be cases that
support the necessity of the relation, and the reason is that the truth of conditional
strengthened by these clauses just shows the causal irrelevance of the presumed
interferer. Indeed, no variation in the hand holding the match or in the colour of the
match results in any variation in the flammability of the match. The case of the
missing oxygen is one in which an event similar to the one described in the
unstrengthen condition is occurring, one that doesn’t guarantee for the manifes-
tation of the disposition. However, the property is causally relevant, because the
manifestation is affected. Two options are at stake in this regard. First, as we saw,
necessity is discrete, so similarity in the antecedent per se is no guarantee of
similarity in manifestation (pace Hume). A fortiori, if we end up with dissimilar
manifestations, wemaywell guess that the cause wasn’t similar after all. Second, as
a matter of fact, the two stimulating events – a striking in the presence of oxygen
and a striking in its absence – are not compossible. The missing oxygen is not
compossible with the conditions holding in the successful case.21 Now, it is a
standard view that a counterfactual is vacuously true if the antecedent is empty,
contradictory or impossible.22 The case of the missing oxygen determines an
impossible antecedent, because it sets two not compossible states. Hence, it
makes the conditional vacuously true. Let me expand on this problem.
It is coherent with the necessitarian thesis to claim that if A necessitates B, then
A&ϕ necessitates B. The problem is whether A excludes ϕ, that is, if they are
21 Clearly, other conditions might be made explicit (the match not being wet, no wind blow-
ing), but this is exactly what is part of any scientific enterprise: finding out the relevant
properties for any given interaction.
22 This is also used as a constraint for non-monotonic reasoning. See Meyer and Veltman
(2007, 1021). Basically, adding an extra premise in a counterfactual of the form A□→B is not
allowed, if it is the case that the antecedent A and the extra premise S are such that A □→ ~ S is
true and A □→S is false. In the remaining case, strengthening A with S is valid. On vacuous
truth and compossibility see Lewis (1973).
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compossible or not: the match cannot be struck in the presence and in the absence
of oxygen, at least not in an empirically reasonable sense. If ϕ individuates a
condition which is not compossible with A, the necessitation relation holds vacu-
ously. If this is the case, then strengthening cannot be accomplished for any ϕ.
Here is a further analogy that illustrates how to interpret the A-S test in
conjunction with Causal Relevance and the Hobbes’ Principle. Take A to be
“These two blocks of the same mass are placed, one on each dish of this pair of
scales” and B to be “This pair of scales is at equilibrium”. So, the relation is: “It
is necessary that if these two blocks of the same mass are placed, one on each
dish of a pair of scales, this pair of scales will be at equilibrium”. Now, if ϕ is
“an extra block is placed on one of the scales” the consequent is obviously false.
What is revealed by such falsity?
On the one hand, we could see this as direct evidence that the pair of scales is
functioning properly. Vice versa, if the scales had remained at equilibrium once the
extra block was added, we would instead have evidence that either there was some
malfunction of the scales/the presence of a safe block –which prevented them from
moving – or that the mass is causally irrelevant for the functioning of the scales.
Once the first two hypotheses are discarded, in this case the A-S test shows that
mass is at least one causally relevant property of the scales disposition to balance,
because variations in the magnitude of P (different masses placed on the two
dishes) will result in variations in the magnitude of R (the balance of the scales).
Being the mass a relevant property in the relation, we get that the first event, the
antecedent in the conditional, should be interpreted as saying “These two blocks of
the same mass, and only these two, are placed, one on each dish, on this pair of
scales.” This is an application of Hobbes’ Principle, that states that all relevant
properties are necessary for any given causal relation, in the light of the principle of
causal relevance, that sets which properties are salient for the relation at stake. That
is, we build the pair of scales so that they are at equilibrium when and only when
two blocks of the samemass are properly placed, one on each of the two dishes.23 If
this is the case, placing an extra block on one of the dishes is incompatible with the
antecedent and makes it contradictory. Consequently, the antecedent being contra-
dictory, the conditional becomes vacuously true. It is important to note that the
compossibility condition should be applied at the level of powers, as mentioned in
conditions 1 and 2 in the interaction analysis given above.24
23 I am thinking here of the manipulability view of causation as in Menzies and Price (1993).
24 One may wonder whether my speaking of com-possibility is circular, given the modal
character of the notion. I think that the proper reading of that notion is along the lines given
by the following principle:
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The A-S test thus has the merit of making the causally relevant properties
apparent and clear, but not of showing the non-necessity of the conditionals. So,
in setting the conditional, we refer to the structural or underlying powers that
make the phenomenal properties of the disposition possible under some con-
ditions, as stressed by Heil (2012, 123 et passim) in his argument concerning
networks of causal powers. If a match lights when struck, the counterfactual
analysis of this observed disposition picks out the necessitating condition(s),
independent of our knowledge of them. I may come to know, a posteriori, what
these conditions are, perhaps measuring the causal relevance of the fundamen-
tal powers at stake, but the conditional is set metaphysically, not epistemically.
Our ignorance of the underlying powers involved doesn’t entail an open set of
sufficient conditions. It is the purpose of science, after all, to specify which
factors and conditions are causally relevant and which are not. This point has
been expressed by Schrenk (2010a, 2010b), who has stressed that: “the fact that
we, epistemically and/or semantically can’t get a good grip on these conditions
[…] does neither mean that these conditions do, ontologically, not exist nor that
a less demanding, maybe benignly circular, yet still informative characterization
(as opposed to a strictly reductive analysis) of dispositions can be given.”
(Schrenk 2010b, 174–5).
So the necessitarian has no difficulties with the A-S test, because its pre-
sumed violations are just ways to make the causally relevant properties explicit.
There are as many necessitation relations as the conditions in which a causal
relation occurs. Our duty is to make those conditions explicit, and the A-S test is
a way to point out what is causally relevant and when. In sum, the strengthen-
ing in the A-S test either adds a relevant but incompatible condition, making the
conditional vacuously true, or it adds a compatible but irrelevant condition,
leaving the conditional truth untouched.
CP: Two states/properties are compossible if and only if they do not compete for the same
qualitative space.
For instance, being red and being yellow compete for the qualitative space colour as obtain-
ing in the same time and location. You can’t have something which is red and yellow at the very
same time and in the very same spot (cfr. Lombard 1986; excluding the possibility of time travel.
Properties, and states in general, completely saturate qualitative spaces. Now, there is nothing
worryingly dispositional or modal in such a view. Saying that placing the extra block on the
pair of scales is not compossible with nothing else being placed on the scales but the two mass-
equivalent objects amounts to saying that the actual state of the scale having the extra block
rules out the state of not having this extra block there. One state or property completely
saturates the actual qualitative space. Therefore, no circularity is involved in appealing to the
concept of com-possibility.
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A Survey of Cases
I have so far concerned myself with countering the attacks mounted by Mumford
and Anjum against necessitarianism.25 However, I still need to explain how
necessitarians can deal with all the cases in which an interference occurs. In
the literature on dispositions, these interferers have been classified into four
main categories. In the following, I provide an analysis of each category and
also provide an illustrative example.
Fink: (When the match is struck the surface on which it is struck becomes
perfectly smooth): the interferer, the smoothness of the surface, is causally
relevant for the occurring of the power temperature for ignition. In this case,
the value at which the stimulus occurred wasn’t sufficient for ignition. The
necessity of the relation is untouched. If the smoothness of the surface is
reduced, i. e. its abrasiveness is increased, the temperature for ignition will
rise more quickly, thus resulting in a change in the relation that determines
the ease with which the stimulus results in the manifestation of the disposition.
Mask: (Reducing – to zero – the oxygen present). One of the fundamental
powers behind the relation is excluded, and a new necessitation is in order.
(Consider: wrapping a glass masks its fragility: even if, say, the mass and
momentum of the hitting hammer both remain the same, the resultant vector
of force on the glass surface is only apparently similar: a hard hit results in a
much reduced impact).
Antidote: (The Sulphur on the match head is mixed with a chemical that
blocks its reaction with oxygen). One of the fundamental powers of S is tam-
pered with in terms of the chain-reaction required for the match to be flamma-
ble, so S is not occurring. (This point also applies in the case of the boron rods
described by Bird 1998).
Mimic: (A marble match lights thanks to a sorcerer). Many fundamental
powers P1, P2, … Pn are added where originally there was none. This is tanta-
mount to an interference with the dispositions that constitute the property of
being a piece of marble.
This sensitivity to conditions can be better appreciated if we consider the
nature of stimuli. What is a stimulus? Anjan Chakravartty (in conversation) has
suggested we consider stimuli to be INUS conditions (Mackie 1965). An INUS
condition has causal powers because some parts of it are necessary but insuffi-
cient against a context in which others are sufficient but unnecessary. So, a
25 A different reply to Mumford and Anjum has been given by Williams (2014), who thinks that
necessity is in force on precisely defined temporal parts of causal processes.
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stimulus is not just a single precise entity, but a complex. This complex is not
undifferentiated; there are elements in it that are more causally relevant than
others, and such causal relevance varies according to the relation picked out by
the causal relevance principle. This internal complexity is revealed by the way
the stimulus interacts with a dispositional property. For instance, in phenomena
such as radioactive decay, all states are equivalent stimuli for a given disposi-
tion. If, however, there is just one very particular state that must be exemplified
for a disposition to occur, we have encountered an extremely specific disposi-
tion. These are the two extremes of a continuous spectrum. For many disposi-
tions, as a matter of fact, there could be many states that can be taken to be
stimuli: objects consisting of different materials can still result in the equili-
brium of a pair of scales. What is crucial is the fundamental powers that are in
play. The kind of material is causally irrelevant for the balancing of the scale.
A Further Concern
A source of concern could be the question: is all this ad hoc? It may seem that I
am constructing an argument to spell out the ceteris paribus clause by saying
that all the problematic cases are to be excluded from the very beginning. I think
there is a clear line of defence here. The A-S test, I argue, is a common practice
in science used to make apparent which properties are causally relevant for any
given relation, to ensure well-controlled experiments. After all, well-controlled
experiments aim to have perfectly repeatable results, which is the mundane side
of necessity. If the hypothesis is that A necessitates B and this proves not to be
the case, then the further hypothesis is that there is some hidden ϕ that is
preventing B from occurring and this ϕ should be removed or explicitly consid-
ered in the experimental setting.26
Two famous cases come to the mind. The first is the discovery of back-
ground radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson, who were awarded the
Nobel Prize in 1978. The other is the discovery of Neptune by Adams and Le
Verrier. Let us consider the first case. The two scientists were trying to develop a
zero-noise antenna at the Bell Laboratories. According to their calculations, the
antenna they were building was supposed to be perfectly noiseless. However,
there was a noise uniformly distributed in the environment. What was wrong?
The situation was as follows:
26 Chakravartty takes ceteris paribus clause to be a “partial map of property relations”, in
Chakravartty (2003, 409).
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A= this antenna screens off any physical noise;
B = this antenna detects no noise.
A → B
Yet, apparently, A was true, and B was false
Penzias and Wilson searched for any ϕ such that its presence would have
explained the falsity of B. The ϕ had to be a noise that could not be filtered
out. Inquiring with physicists they discovered that they were the first to listen to
background radiation. The noise that they were recording wasn’t a noise, but a
signal: the signal of the Big Bang. The interfering factor was and would always
be present and is now considered to be a stable interference. So, A and ϕ should
have read: this antenna filters out any physical noise and there is a noise that
cannot be filtered out. The conditional, then, having two non compossible
conditions A and ϕ holds vacuously. Since it was not possible to avoid ϕ, we
were forced to accept that it was not possible to have A. The context is part and
parcel of the conditions in which any conditional with some modal force has to
be interpreted.
Summing this up: if the original four theses envisaged by Mumford and
Anjum were meant as an attack on necessitarianism, they fail; if they are
intended to show that the modality behind dispositions is different from logical
necessity than they can easily be accepted by necessitarianism as I have pre-
sented it. For necessitarianism holds that dispositions give rise to a form of
natural necessity exemplified in patterns described in conditional terms.
A Final Point
There is a final point to be made. In a recent paper, Anjum and Mumford
(2018) have argued that logic should follow our metaphysical intuitions,
rather than having metaphysics enslaved to logic. They argue that proposi-
tional logic is well suited for a Humean metaphysical view, in which every-
thing is disconnected. The limit of such a view can be appreciated, Mumford
and Anjum continue, by observing the difficulties and insufficiency of
Carnap’s analysis of dispositional terms in Testability and Meaning (Carnap
1936–1937). And one of the paradoxical and senseless consequences of adopt-
ing classical logic to analyse conditional statements is precisely that they are
true given the falsity of the antecedent. Abandoning classical logic and re-
defining conditional statements according to the dispositional view should be
at the centre of the agenda. A new logic follows, or so they argue.
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Now, it is not possible to enter this debate here; it suffices to note that
necessitarianism addresses the issue of disconnectedness as well, and does so
using the weapons of classical logic, without recourse to specially designed
weapons. And there are already attempts being made in this direction: Boniolo
et al. (2015) have argued that biochemical pathways can be viewed as deductive
inferences, using the tools of classical logic. They have argued that chemical
syntheses are context-sensitive, which makes non-monotonicity a desideratum
in the context of classical logic. Above, I have attempted to show that the
apparent collapse of the necessitation relation is due to specific contextual
settings. It is therefore no wonder that necessitation doesn’t hold in certain
cases.27 In sum, I think that necessitarianism doesn’t require a change in logic
because the connection issue at stake is not a matter of logic. Difficulties with
contexts are not to be confused with difficulties with analyses.
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